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The legal system has a fundamental influence upon risk in today's society. This paper examines some mechanisms by which the system affects decisions on the acceptability of public risk and the unintended consequences. Within the concept of the legal system we include appeal courts, first instance courts, barristers, solicitors, court experts and also regulators who have a quasi-legislative function. We have also been mindful of the influence of the European courts.  Our approach is primarily through the medium of health and safety regulations and personal injury litigation.  Many points have been illustrated with case studies.

It is concluded that the activities and modes of operation of this sector have a large impact upon risk decision making in the public arena. We share the view that the Government has developed a sound framework for the assessment of risk enshrined in statutes such as the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, but the question is whether this framework is properly applied. 

The legal system is seen as being conservative and preferring to make any changes in an incremental way.  Legal advice offered to duty holders may minimise their risk of legal penalties but by its conservative nature tends to place restrictions and administrative burdens which combine with other interpretations of what the law requires (i.e. standards, codes of Practice, etc) to restrict the duty holders’ operating domain and business options.

The mutual influences of the legal system with other actor groups have shown distinct differences between courts of first instance (commonly referred to as lower courts) and appeal courts. Courts of first instance are particularly influenced by standard setters, experts, insurers, and regulators whilst the appeal courts are particularly influenced by public attitudes and expectation, and politicians (the law makers).  Both types of courts exert substantial influences on a wide range of risk actors.  

Courts of first instance are heavily reliant on standards and although examples of them making principled decisions have been quoted, we consider that generally they do not pay adequate regard to the bases of the standards, relevance to the case, or original purpose.  By contrast appeal courts are far more concerned with basic principles and the intent of the originating law makers.  

We have noted two main problems. One is a failure to recognise that in the public arena the risk management decisions involve the additional and fundamental dimension of the benefits or social utility of activities and amenities. The importance of this has been recognised in common law, and recent judgements by appeal courts have strongly reinforced this requirement. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has also begun to make statements supporting the consideration of benefits, although much of its advisory material has yet to reflect this change. The second main problem has been an observed drift away from the original intent of the legislators, that risk should be reduced so far as reasonably practicable, to one which favours risk minimisation or elimination. Despite statements by health and safety regulators recognising the need for a balanced approach, the main thrust in practice is still one of minimising or eliminating risk with little reference to cost, difficulty or unintended consequences.

Given the comparative absence of appropriate advice on the assessment and management of public risk, it is perhaps therefore unsurprising that experts who give evidence in the lower courts tend to commit the same two basic errors described above. The safety net for dealing with these matters is the appeal courts, however to appeal to these is a long, traumatic and expensive route which few are able to take.

We are concerned that conditional fee arrangements coupled with increased settlements out-of-court are having the effect of reducing the availability of insurance or increasing premiums and hence discouraging activities with demonstrable public benefit, as well as providing a ready supply of media stories.  Deterioration in economic conditions may exacerbate this effect. Contrary to some recent work, we believe there is a ‘compensation culture’.

Our paper concludes that there are growing lapses and deviations from the letter and spirit of the original legislative framework. In particular, these emanate from a failure, also noted by the House of Lords, to pay sufficient attention to the trade-off between “personal liberty and public regulation.” For “personal liberty” we might, in the context of this paper, prefer to substitute “benefits of public amenities and activities,” but the meaning is almost the same. The report gives our views on how these lapses came about, notably but not exclusively in the context of health and safety, through a single-minded pursuit of risk minimisation. 





























Main paper: Judges, courts, the legal profession and public risk 
1. Introduction
Through BERR, the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council (RRAC) has commissioned a suite of papers examining how key groups of ‘risk actors’ influence risk decision making in the context of public risks, and how, in particular, their involvement might lead to an approach to public risk which amplifies or diminishes the relative importance of specific hazards or otherwise leads to unintended consequences. This paper investigates the influence, direct or indirect, of the group of risk actors falling under the banner of ‘judges, courts and the legal profession.’ Our approach is primarily, though not exclusively, to do this through the medium of health and safety regulation and personal injury litigation.

2. The approach
The RRAC has identified ten common questions which it wishes to be applied to all the identified actor groups. Our aim is to respond to each question based upon our experience, professional, practical and academic, and literature review. Included in this, are examples of cases and case law which we believe are important in demonstrating how the legal process influences decision making in relation to public risk. In the time available it has not been possible to make a quantitative assessment of trends but some examples are noted which may be indicative of such.

3. Description of the ‘Actor Group’
The group is broad and diverse, including not only the courts (civil and criminal, courts of first instance and appeal courts), and the judiciary, but also barristers, solicitors, inspectors, and experts who give evidence in court. Barristers and solicitors also provide more general public risk advice to their clients.  Regulatory agencies such as the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) are also included because, although their powers derive from government statute and thereby might be seen as prescribed, they have the power to determine rules and ways of working, as well as to prosecute, and thus may extend, interpret and influence the law in their own way.  This actor group is increasingly turning its attention to Europe including the European court.

4. Reasons for involvement of the Actor Group with public risks
The reasons for involvement are largely self-evident. In some way or another it is their appointed job or profession, motivated by various levels of commercial and professional self-interest, and sometimes underpinned by legislation. As for the scope of the involvement, the short answer is, wherever there is an actual or potential civil or criminal liability.

5. History of involvement with public risk
5.1 Development of Public Authority Liabilities
The group’s involvement with public risk is well illustrated by the development of public authority liabilities.  

Private law responsibility is not confined to private bodies: public bodies may face a combination of public law and private law liabilities.  The courts have to determine the extent to which public functions shape the exposure of public authorities.  Private law responsibilities of public authorities include traditional torts (or “wrongs”) such as nuisance and negligence as well as torts that are specific to public authorities such as breach of statutory duty.

Litigation, based on the tort of negligence is one of the principal drivers in the treatment of public risk.  The essential elements of negligence are the need to establish a duty of care, breach and resulting damage although these components may overlap and merge with one another.  In Caparo –v- Dickman ​[1]​ a three stage test for the existence of a duty of care was expounded, namely: 
	Reasonable foreseeability of harm;
	Sufficient proximity between the parties;
	That it is fair, just and reasonable to impose liability.
The two-stage 'Anns Test' was subsequently defined by Lord Wilberforce for establishing whether a duty of care exists:
	First there must be a ‘sufficient relationship of proximity based upon foreseeability’
	Second there should be consideration of reasons why there should not be a duty of care. 

This clarification was at first welcomed but has not entirely resolved the situation (see, for example, Charlesworth & Percy (1997) section 2-22/23). For instance, uncertainty remains over the definition of proximity – was it just about likelihood of harm or a composite of that and linkage, and should the second stage be interpreted in a general or a specific fashion?

The courts have developed an incremental approach to determining the ingredients necessary to establish a duty of care in novel situations ​[2]​ but case law has highlighted the limitations of conventional legal mechanisms as a means of developing coherent principle to reflect the significance of a Defendant’s intrinsically public function.  The dimension created by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Court of Human Rights has added a further layer of complexity.

The legislature has recognised the influence of court judgments upon public risk  and by the Compensation Act 2006 sought to address what was suggested by the Better Regulation Task Force report of May 2004 (Better Routes to Redress) to be a common misperception that could lead to a disproportionate fear of litigation and consequent risk – averse behaviour.  The Act did not alter the standard of care, nor the circumstances in which a duty to take that care is owed but was solely concerned with the court’s assessment of what constitutes reasonable care in the case before it.  The Act was intended to provide reassurance to the people and organisations concerned about possible litigation and to ensure that normal activities were not prevented because of the fear of litigation.  Section 1 of the Act provides that in considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty, a court may, in determining whether the Defendant should have taken particular steps to meet a standard of care (whether by taking precautions or otherwise), have regard to whether a requirement to take those steps might prevent an activity which is desirable from taking place (either at all, to a particular extent, or in a particular way), or might discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with the activity.

The effect of the Act upon the courts’ appreciation of public risk is not known.  There are no cases that we are aware of where reference to the relevant parts of the Act have been cited in the judgment.  

The Law Commission in its consultation paper 187​[3]​ notes the trend of a general expansion of liability of public bodies in the tort of negligence, and the unsatisfactory nature of the current situation.  

Over the years there have been many cases where the courts have had to decide whether risk taking was reasonable or negligent.  Case history indicates that a number of factors are relevant.  These are: 
	 Magnitude of a risk​[4]​; 
	Gravity of possible injury​[5]​; 
	Social utility of a Defendant’s actions​[6]​; 
	Practicability of precautions​[7]​ .  

All of these considerations are potentially relevant in situations involving public risk, whether in civil or criminal cases​[8]​. Lawyers have been dealing with public risk since at least the late 19thCentury, thus developing the ‘Tort of Negligence.’ The law of tort (i.e. wrong) has many strands, for example, nuisance, trespass and defamation. In the area of personal injury the dominant tort is that of negligence. Central concepts underpinning this tort are the need to take reasonable care where there exists reasonable foreseeability of harm. Thus, the duty holder must take reasonable care in managing reasonably foreseeable risks.

5.2 Regulatory extension
Against the backdrop of the development of the law of negligence in recent years there has been a substantial increase in regulation.  Notably the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 had an immediate and conspicuous effect upon the management of risk in the UK, since it brought local government, hospitals, education and other services into the same regulatory fold as workers in industry. Also brought under this legislative umbrella for the first time were those ‘affected by work activities.’ “In the mid-1970s, this latter provision provoked widespread astonishment.”​[9]​ 

The genesis of regulatory agencies like the HSE is itself a fairly recent development, partly resulting from the increasing complexity of economic life, which has made it difficult for the legislature to cope directly, and requiring further guidance to what is required for legal compliance.​[10]​

5.3 Judicial interpretations
Judges interpret the legislative and common law principles and hence determine the level of risk which should or should not have been taken in given cases, thereby setting common law precedents. They are not however detached from the reactions of the wider public, nor would they wish to be, since acceptability of risk is intrinsically a socioeconomic-political issue. 

Thus, personal injury barrister Jerome Mayhew​[11]​ has proposed that the approach of society to the question of what is an acceptable risk has influenced the judiciary which has attempted to reflect this shift in its interpretation of a defendant’s duty of care. For example, judges have, he says, interpreted with increasing stringency situations which would previously have been regarded as ones of voluntarily-accepted risk, while apparently not taking account of the cumulative impact on society of this approach to awards of compensation.

5.4 Changes to legal processes
Mayhew also asserts that the above situation has been exacerbated by the introduction of conditional fee agreements (CFAs – ‘no win no fee’). This has placed a burden on insurers which is then passed on to consumers in the form of increased premiums or removal of the offer of cover. Although the Better Regulation Task Force has not noted an increase in the total number of accident cases registered between 2001/2 and 2003/4, which seemingly contradicts the above, Mayhew says that the contemporaneous reorganisation by government of civil procedure rules in 1999 has encouraged the settlement of claims prior to the issue of proceedings, thus obscuring the reality which is that higher premiums or no offer of cover have resulted in the demise of hundreds of small providers of adventurous activities over the last few years.  This effect has been exacerbated by higher settlements for those cases that do come to court.

Over and above this shifting background, lawyers generally give cautious advice to encourage their clients to stay comfortably within the legislative and common law risk boundaries. 

6. Contribution of the group to risk amplification or attenuation
The actor group, as noted, contains many diverse elements, each of whom influences risk decision making in its own way. In this section we discuss how risk decisions may be affected.

6.1 Approach of the first instance courts to risk decisions
In our experience courts of first instance, in deciding upon liability, tend to hear evidence drawn largely from expert opinion. This in turn is frequently based upon comparison with what is regarded as good practice, often in the form of standards, ACOPs (Approved Code of Practice) or published advice which may come from standards agencies, regulators, trade associations, or voluntary organisations. In cases where no such material is available, there is a tendency to either extrapolate from other published advice or to lean upon expert opinion.

This approach is consistent with the recommendations of the Robens Committee,​[12]​ and is liked because it provides an apparent certainty to the decision making process. However, it may also give rise to problems via a number of mechanisms. First, there is a tendency to regard specific safety requirements, e.g. those set out in regulations or even non-mandatory advice, as minimum standards.​[13]​  While there may be logic in doing this in the occupational sector where the benefits of the occupational activity are a given, within the public safety sector the requirement should, we argue, be to balance (optimise) the risk of things and activities against their benefits​[14]​. For example, The Orange Book refers to hazards which are familiar and known to involve risk, such as participation in sports, but which are accepted by the public because of their benefits.​[15]​ To seek to minimise risk or otherwise give greater prominence to this aspect, as is implied by the notion of treating standards as minimum requirements, is quite different from that of achieving a balance, and in fact would amount to an unspoken political choice in favour of safety over benefits.​[16]​

Case study: The 1988 version of the European Standard on the safety of playground equipment (BSEN1176-1988) states that “It is not the purpose of this standard to encompass the play value (sic).” Authors of the standard now agree that this was wrong and the 2008 version corrects (superficially at least) this error by acknowledging the benefits of play and essentially the need for a trade-off between risk of injury and play value. It should be obvious that a play equipment safety standard which did not consider the benefits of the equipment and thereby strike a reasonable balance between risk and benefit would be an absurdity. Few standards and ACOPs, however, acknowledge this trade-off and one can only wonder what impact this has had on the courts, not to mention the production of the standards themselves. 

A second and common occurrence in first instance courts is an unrealistic attention to the minutiae and technical detail of standards and written documentation. Technical experts have a tendency to prefer measurement over the uncertainties of argument and often present their evidence in the form of detailed dimensional comparisons with published advice.

Case study: A claimant injured his back when landing in a splash pool at the foot of a water slide. It was argued that the water was too shallow and he had thereby contacted the bottom of the pool. The case was decided on the evidence of a German standard which said splash pools should be 1 metre (39 inches) deep. The pool in question was 36 inches deep. Although there is no scientific evidence that a change from 36 to 39 inches makes any difference, and that the German choice of 39 inches was obviously an approximation based on their use of the metric system whereas the British preference for 36 inches was based on the imperial yard, the claimant was successful.

Case study: In Perry and Perry v Harris [Court of Appeal July 2008] Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers described how the High Court had ruled for the claimant in an accident which occurred on a bouncy castle. In reversing that ruling, he accepted the argument of Mr Eklund QC, for the defence, that the written advice and documentation of the company providing the bouncy castle had been wrongly used by the High Court judge and that is was an improper substitute for a necessary analysis of whether the standard of care provided at the time of the accident was reasonable.

In this way the notion of reasonableness becomes sidelined and is replaced with formulaic issues of compliance with some piece of advice, with what may be little consideration of the relevance of the advice, its quality, applicability, let alone the underlying risk-benefit trade-off. Indeed, there are few instances where this kind of advice can be shown to have been based upon risk assessment,​[17]​ yet the primary legal responsibility of duty holders is to make decisions based upon risk assessment.

However, it has to be acknowledged that while risk assessment should be paramount over and above compliance with standards and ACOPs, the route to achieving supposed legitimacy has largely become one of standards compliance. The implication is that more enlightened duty holders may be penalised by not taking this now conventional route, even though that route is not necessarily designed to deal with the specific circumstances and may not be tantamount to a risk assessment, let alone an appropriate trade-off between risk and benefit.

A further common issue in first instance courts is a failure to overcome the problem of hind-sight. Duty holders are generally responsible for managing a plethora of hazards before a situation arises, and this requires prioritisation. Retrospectively, it is only too easy to focus upon some particular incident and identify areas of compromise where things could have been done differently. Few cases in first instance courts take this broad perspective, possibly because of a lack of time, awareness, or confidence. Reliance upon standards and written codes provides an easy and apparently secure bedrock compared with the challenge of risk assessment and common sense decision making. Unfortunately, it is risk assessment and common sense decision making which is required in the domain of public risks. 

This is not at all to say that there are no examples where the first instance courts have reached principle-based decisions:

Case study:​[18]​ A visitor to Ripon Cathedral suffered an ankle injury after stepping in a depression in a step in a narrow walkway leading to the crypt. The walkway was not fitted with a handrail. The visitor took the Cathedral to court under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957, section 2, claiming damages. The judge ruled in favour of the Cathedral.  It was noted that a risk assessment of the area had been completed and found no significant danger, the area was well lit, and a one-way system with signage was in place to guide visitors.  The court also found that a hand-rail was not necessary in view of the narrow width of the walkway and that buildings of such antiquity inherently have uneven surfaces for which it is not reasonable to interfere with the fabric of the building unless it posed a real danger. Additional signage was also considered unnecessary.  The court also said it was reasonable to assume that visitors would take particular care when walking in building of that age. There was no history of accidents in the crypt area.

The case clearly makes the point that it is reasonable to expect visitors to take extra care in buildings of this kind (i.e. where the risk is inherently higher but for some good reason) and that those responsible for the upkeep of buildings should not be expected to pursue zero or minimal risk which would be very expensive, unachievable, and might ruin a building’s character. 

The following case involves a more natural managed environment:

Case study:​[19]​ A visitor to an RSPB reserve was walking on a trail cut through the more remote part of the woodland reserve when he allegedly tripped on a small sapling stump remaining from the path clearance work causing him to fall onto another stump resulting in the loss of an eye. The judge ruled that the presence of such stumps was commonplace in woodlands and trails and did not constitute a breach of duty under the 1957 Occupiers Liability Act. The decision also took account of the small number of visitors who could be expected at that part of the reserve and the absence of previous incident records or complaints. 

Again, this reinforces the view that an approach based on risk elimination or minimisation is neither required nor practicable, especially where there is no record of significant numbers of accidents. In the time available to us it has not been possible to research any trends in the types of judgements made in these cases over the years although it is our view that the perceived positive trend may be continuing.

6.2 Approach of the appeal courts to risk decisions
There have been a number of cases which indicate that the higher courts (Court of Appeal, House of Lords) take a different line in reaching decisions about cases involving risk. There is less reliance upon standards and protocols and more consideration of the antecedent risk, prior case law, the principles embodied in statutes, and even the benefits of public activities. Decisions are also influenced by trends in public opinion (not just that expressed through the papers).

Case study: Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough Council [House of Lords, 2003].  Brereton Heath Country Park in Cheshire contains an attractive lake bordered by sandy beaches frequently used by families.  Mr Tomlinson ran into the water and plunged-in head first causing his head to strike the sandy bottom of the lake, breaking his neck and rendering him tetraplegic.   Lord Hoffmann said (para. 34): “My lords, the majority of the Court of Appeal​[20]​ appear to have proceeded on the basis that if there was a foreseeable risk of serious injury, the Council was under a duty to do what was necessary to prevent it. But this in my opinion is an oversimplification. Even in the case of the duty owed to a lawful visitor under section 2(2) of the 1957 Act​[21]​ and even if the risk had been attributable to the state of the premises rather than the acts of Mr Tomlinson, the question of what amounts to “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable” depends upon assessing, as in the case of common law negligence, not only the likelihood that someone may be injured and the seriousness of the injury which may occur, but also the social value of the activity which gives rise to the risk and the cost of preventative measures. These facts have to be balanced against each other.”

The above identification of the social value of activities as a factor relevant to risk decisions is important. The House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs recently identified a potential source of shortcomings in the government’s otherwise sound policy on the management of risk as omissions.​[22]​ Experience suggests that the frequent lack of or inappropriate consideration of the risk-benefit trade-off of public activities is such an omission. 

The transcript of the Tomlinson judgement also contains the following statement by Lord Hobhouse (para. 79) which highlights how even basic notions of probability, hazard and risk can be misused during legal proceedings.

“The second point is the mistreatment of the concept of risk. To suffer a broken neck and paralysis for life could hardly be a more serious injury; any loss of life is a consequence of the greatest seriousness. There was undoubtedly a risk of drowning for inexperienced, incompetent or drunken swimmers in the deeper parts of the mere or in patches of weed when they were out of their depth although no lives had actually been lost. But there was no evidence of any incident where anyone before the claimant had broken his neck by plunging from a standing position and striking his head on the smooth sandy bottom on which he was standing. Indeed, at the trial it was not his case that this was what had happened; he had alleged that there must have been some obstruction. There had been some evidence of two other incidents where someone suffered a minor injury (a cut or a graze) to their head whilst diving but there was no evidence that these two incidents were in any way comparable with that involving the claimant. It is then necessary to put these few incidents in context. The park had been open to the public since about 1982. Some 160,000 people used to visit the park in a year. Up to 200 would be bathing in the mere on a fine summer’s day. Yet the number of incidents involving the mere were so few. It is a fallacy to say that because drowning is a serious matter that there is a serious risk of drowning. In truth the risk of drowning was very low indeed and there had never actually been one and the accident suffered by the claimant was unique. Whilst broken necks can result from incautious or reckless diving, the probability of one being suffered in the circumstances of the claimant were so remote that the risk was minimal. The internal reports before this accident make the common but elementary error of confusing the seriousness of the outcome with the degree of risk that it will occur.”

First instance courts also tend to make much of provision of warnings by duty holders, even of the obvious. The following Appeal Court judgement did not support this trend.

Case study: Recently the Appeal Court judgement in Poppleton v Trustees of the Portsmouth Youth Activities Committee[2008] reached a decision contrary to the notion of the compensation culture and exhibiting what has been described as a ‘return to common sense and traditional legal principles.’​[23]​The case involved a man who was paralysed from the neck down after falling from a climbing wall. Mr Poppleton and some friends were "bouldering" - low-level free climbing without ropes - when he fell from a height of about 1.45 metres when he attempted to swing or jump across to a grab bar on an adjacent wall. Lord Justice May said: "There being inherent and obvious risks in the activity which Mr Poppleton was voluntarily undertaking, the law did not in my view require the appellants to prevent him from undertaking it, nor to train him or supervise him while he did it, or see that others did so. "If the law required training or supervision in this case it would equally be required for a multitude of other commonplace leisure activities which nevertheless carry with them a degree of obvious inherent risk - as for instance bathing in the sea.. "It makes no difference to this analysis that the appellants charged Mr Poppleton to use the climbing wall, nor that the rules which they displayed could have been more prominent." Mr Poppleton had alleged a failure to assess or monitor ability, no proper induction, inadequate surveillance or supervision and failure to actively explain rules and warnings.

It is of interest to note that Judge Richard Foster, sitting at the High Court in London in 2007, had ruled there was a breach of duty of care in not informing Mr Poppleton of the latent danger of the shock absorbent matting not providing complete safety from falling. Lord Justice May, overturning this decision, said the risk of falling from the wall was plainly obvious: "The risk of probably severe injury from an awkward fall was obvious and did not sustain a duty in the appellants to warn Mr Poppleton of it.”

Taken together, these statements​[24]​ demonstrate a divergence between more and less fundamental approaches to managing risk. As Lord Hobhouse says, there is a frequent failure to distinguish between serious risk and serious consequences. Given the tendency of experts in court to think in terms of worst case scenarios when assessing risks, this catapults some trivial risks into the serious domain. In our experience first instance courts rarely think about risk (as in the probability of harm) in an objective way as Lord Hobhouse did. Similarly, they tend not to recognise the trade-off with benefits, as identified by Lord Hoffmann: “These facts have to be balanced against each other.”

6.3 Approach of experts in court
Experts who give testimony in court are nowadays required to include in their written evidence a statement of the following kind:

‘I confirm that insofar as the facts stated in my report are within my own knowledge I have made clear which they are and I believe them to be true, and that the opinions I have expressed represent my true and complete professional opinion.’

This is a strangely worded statement which conflates facts with opinions, suggesting that the originator(s) was not conversant with the age-old debate over objectivity versus subjectivity. Many would argue that facts are dependent on one’s worldview (e.g. Adams​[25]​), and others that values always come before evidence (e.g. Seedhouse​[26]​). Without descending into a relativistic morass, experience has shown, both in and out of court, that experts have very different views, seemingly taken for granted, about concepts which are quite basic to decision making over risk. Table 1 lists no less than eight different understandings of what is meant by ‘safe’, a term which is widely-used and thereby fundamental to opinion-giving in legal proceedings involving safety. These understandings range from the rash though surprisingly resilient belief in ‘zero risk’ on the left of the Table, to the pragmatic and statutory position on the right, that risks should be reduced so far as is reasonably practicable, or, more simply, so far as reasonable.

A shrewd lawyer who is looking for an expert to further his client’s case would sensibly seek one whose position on this spectrum was most appropriate.

Case study: A recent invitation to act as an expert in a case involving a bouncy castle and a claimant, who had fallen over on exiting the castle, was predicated on the expert’s willingness to make measurements of the impact attenuating properties of the surrounding ground. On pointing out that, in this particular expert’s view, this was a waste of time and a diversion, the line went dead.
	
In many cases involving risk, the prejudice of the expert with regard to what vision of safety is theirs, is unquestioned and likely unconsidered, though in some cases it can be deduced. As mentioned in our paper on ‘‘Standards setters and public risk,’ many experts, perhaps the majority, are committed to standards and codes of practice as benchmarks of ‘safety’ and little else. 

Figure 1: The Conway foot and cycle path has been the subject of a debate over whether the risk posed to cyclists and pedestrians warranted the river being fenced off. Clearly the answer to this question will depend very much upon the expert’s priorities and risk prejudices. There is no objective answer out there, although an understanding of risk statistics and principles of risk management might help. 

Some, however, would appear to be more attuned to zero risk (or at least something approaching that). These include campaign groups of which RoSPA, the Royal Society for Prevention of Accidents, would outwardly at least appear to fit into that zero risk slot.​[27]​ Surprisingly, the adoption by the Health and Safety Commission of goal-setting targets for risk,​[28]​ and the frequent referral by the HSE in its publications to ‘risk minimisation,’​[29]​ make the location of the HSC/E in Table 1 ambiguous. This it should not be, since HSE’s position is plainly described by the Health and Safety at Work etc Act (1974) and is predicated upon the concept of reasonable practicability. As Green has noted,​[30]​ agency decisions will be based upon their interpretation of the law, but in this regard we think the distinction between risk minimisation and reducing risks so far as is reasonably practicable is so obvious as to amount to more than a matter of interpretation.

In situations where both sides in a case appoint experts this too can lead to problems. In some cases duels are fought and ideas are used as weapons rather than to present the truth. In others experts may form alliances for a variety of reasons.  Attempts to overcome the ‘duelling expert syndrome’ include the appointment of a single joint expert (SJE) who acts for both claimant and defence. Outwardly, although this appears a good idea, it in practice brings its own, possibly worse problems, for the court is now at the mercy of the opinion of one expert and the check of another is lost. The job of the astute solicitor then becomes that of getting an SJE who s/he believes is most likely to occupy a position favourable to their cause. An alternative approach has been to retain two experts but to get them to prepare for the court a joint statement saying what they agree about and what they disagree about. Unfortunately, these statements are not suitable places for going back to principles, where most disputes are in fact anchored, and tend only to deal with the superficial.

In other situations the contest between experts can generate complex rulings which have significant national repercussions.

Case study: In Poll v Viscount Asquith, a case which involved an injury to a motor cyclist who collided, on a minor road, with a fallen tree, the experts became entangled in complex discussions about the meaning of ‘medium’ and ‘high’ as in medium or high risk, the validity of expert systems of tree risk assessment in comparison with expert judgement, and the level of inspection which was reasonable of a landowner with trees. The court eventually found in favour of the claimant, a result which implies that tree owners need to have their trees assessed on a regular basis by competent and qualified arboriculturalists.

The feeling of most arboriculturalists is that this is neither practicable nor reasonable because of the environmental and financial costs of inspecting the root collars of every tree every year within falling distance of some target equivalent to a minor road. Notwithstanding that, the ruling has raised the anxiety of many landowners and trees are now being lost throughout the nation on health and safety grounds.

6.4 The legal profession
We have noted earlier that lawyers usually give their clients conservative advice on the management of risk. This is understandable because lawyers see their main task as protecting their clients from claims of liability. However, such an approach pays little heed to the benefits of public amenities or activities. Likewise, because lawyers are not particularly versed in the intricacies of risk assessment, the advice will frequently be in the form of the need to comply with standards, protocols and norms with everything fully documented.​[31]​ When compounded with the inherent conservatism within most standards, the result can be far more restrictive than was ever intended by the relevant primary legislation. This ‘legal straitjacket’ is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 2. We also noted that lawyers can assist their clients by choosing particular experts; a matter which may be compounded by the use of SJEs.

6.5 Inspectors and regulators
The numbers of cases relating to public risk which get to the courts under health and safety legislation (criminal law) appear small in relation to occupational risk cases and those made under civil law.  The criminal cases tend to be more high profile such as those involving rail accidents, and major explosions.  We have a concern that the stance taken by regulators and inspectors can too often be influenced by a wish to assign blame, for whatever reason, the placing of too much emphasis on the consequences of the event in question and not enough on its prior probability, and taking the mere fact that an accident has happened as evidence that the risk assessment was not “suitable and sufficient”.  This ‘hard’ approach to the relatively few criminal cases relating to public risk appears at variance with the public statements made by regulators, especially the HSE, regarding the ‘sensible risk’ management agenda, safety ‘myths’, and common sense approaches to safety.  Overall, we sense a regulator who is not comfortable dealing with public risk within a regulatory system designed for occupational risks. This unease may be compounded by the fact that fines and legal costs imposed on public bodies ultimately penalise the public. It is also not trivial to extrapolate the implications of Section 3 of the HSWA, which refers to an employer’s ‘undertaking’, usually of modest size, to public space which may extend over 100s of square miles or more.

Figure 2: The ‘Legal Straitjacket’


Case study: R v Porter [2008] in which HSE brought a criminal prosecution under the HSWA 1974 after a lengthy delay against the headmaster of a private school in Wales. A small boy had jumped down some steps while playing ‘batman’ in the playground, banged his head, was taken to hospital where he was found to have a relatively minor head injury, with neither a skull fracture nor even a cut. Later he contracted MRSA in hospital and died. The HSE’s case against the school was based primarily upon an alleged lack of supervision in the playground and a failure to do a thorough enough risk assessment of the school grounds. The initial trial by jury was won by the HSE, but subsequently quashed on appeal by Lord Moses.

According to Gerard Forlin and Patrick Harrington QC,​[32]​ who appeared for the appellant in this case, the decision “expanded the law from the definition of risk to encompass the conditions of day to day life… This judgement appears to go some way in rebalancing the law in the field of health and safety; it categorically reaffirms that there must be a real, not theoretical or fanciful risk involved to trigger the Act; lesser risk will not be an acceptable test in the future.”

A further issue stemming from the actions of inspectors and regulators of public risks is the degree of recognition given to the benefits of activities with which the public engage in enjoying public amenities. The factory background of some of these actors (the HSE, many of the technical experts), coupled with the recent tendency to seek risk minimisation, has frequently led to benefits of e.g. unspoilt scenery, sports and pastimes, celebratory events being given little or no weight in the face of the demands of the health and safety inspector. There is an obvious stand-off here between the position of both HM Treasury’s The Green Book and The Orange Book which require benefits of activities to be considered as a part of a decision on public risk, and the quest by some to minimise risk without apparent reference of to benefits. The House of Lords​[33]​ has already noted that assessment and incentive schemes for civil servants may be responsible for promoting risk-averse behaviour, though we suspect that the error here is more akin to oversight. We note that in a few recent cases the HSC/E has begun to speak openly about the need to incorporate benefits in public risk decisions​[34]​ but this requires a significant change in philosophy and will not be accomplished easily. Likewise, risk-benefit trade-off decisions are not just about risk but also the benefits of public activities about which HSE is not particularly knowledgeable. This places the regulator in unfamiliar territory and perhaps a less comfortable position.

7. Interactions with other risk actors
Elsewhere in this report we have discussed the different ways in which the appeal courts and first instance courts work, and the principal dialogues that arise.  As the ways in which the two types of court operate are significantly different from each other we have drawn separate influence diagrams for each type.  Again, for each type of court, there are two diagrams, one showing the influences of the courts on the other actor groups, and vice versa.  The weight of the lines reflects the strength of influence.  As ever, these diagrams are very much a matter of individual judgement and doubtless could inspire much debate.
It should be noted that the boxes at the centre of the first two diagrams representing the courts of first instance are intended to represent the totality of the processes used by the courts and includes the roles of judges, barristers, and solicitors. Similarly, the ‘Appeals Courts’ boxes in the last two diagrams represents the processes employed.






















We consider the insurers and the first instance courts to have much greater mutual interaction than would be the case with insurers and the appeal courts. In first instance courts the award and size of damages will have a direct bearing on the insurer’s calculation of risk and consequently pricing policy. The insurers influence first instance courts in that when claims are settled out-of-court, the merits of the case are denied the opportunity to be tested in court. The pay-off for insurers is that some of the legal costs are avoided. This point is discussed further in our report on the insurers risk actor group​[35]​.

The growth in conditional fee cases which are settled out of court with the insurers we believe has led to an increase in the sums paid out by insurers leading to increased premiums and pressures on smaller, less well resourced, events and activities which may be indicative of an increasing ‘compensation culture’, a trend which will not be revealed by the numbers of cases heard.

7.2 Media
The courts are a significant source of material for the media but we see the direct mutual interaction with the courts as not being particularly strong, although the media have a greater influence on the public who in turn have stronger influence on the appeals courts.

7.3 Politicians
The politicians make laws which provide inherent boundaries to the level of risk which the legislature deems society is prepared to accept. As such the politicians have a major influence on the courts insofar as they are the originators of the laws which the first instance courts have to apply with the higher courts addressing the more fundamental principles of law and the original spirit and intent.

7.4 Standards setters
We have identified elsewhere in this report and in our report on standards setters that standards have a fundamental impact on first instance courts in that they are seen as providing some certainty representing current accepted good practice or even minimum standards. Our previous report on standards-setters​[36]​ identified a number of aspects where we considered improvements should be made.  These included:
	Clarity of purpose and scope
	Consistency of applications
	Advice for use by courts
	Endorsement by regulators
	Statement of principles on which the standard is founded including notably the circulation of regulatory impact assessment/compliance cost assessment statements, with a level of detail appropriate to the issue, at the consultation stage

7.5 Regulators
Regulators tend to build their part by amplifying (i.e. adding detailed interpretations) upon direct legislative and common law obligations (Figure 2), an act which can encourage risk averse, even risk minimisation, policies in society. Organisations such as the HSE tackle organisations which adopt risk taking practices. We also perceive that the way in which the enforcement elements of the HSE pursue prosecutions may be at variance with some of their high-level positioning statements on the sensible risk management agenda, and that the consequences of an accident are far more important to them in bringing a prosecution than its prior likelihood. The net effect of this may be to obscure, from the viewpoint of the first instance courts, the underlying principles of the legislation.

The influence of the regulators on the appeal courts we see as being much less, as these courts are more interested in fundamental principles than their interpretation through regulations and standards and (rightly) see themselves as the ultimate custodians of the law.

7.6 Public
At the appeal courts level we suspect that it is principally public opinion which is the determining influence - not necessarily represented by the forefront of public opinion, but by making sure that the courts do not fall too far behind so as to bring the law into disrepute. Since lawyers tend to be inherently conservative, the notion of precedent serves them well because it ensures that all change is incremental rather than radical. 

7.7 Duty holders (Risk managers)
These will typically go to great lengths to avoid their companies appearing in court and possibly being penalised, and hence are greatly influenced by the outcomes of relevant cases which do come to court. Strict compliance with standards and minimisation of risk may well reduce the chances of being prosecuted or sued, but at the expense of the benefits derived from the activity not being fully realised.

Below the level of court action and enforcement notices there is often a tendency for risk managers to regard the spoken or written word of inspectors as the law, when usually it is given as advice (albeit quite compelling and sometimes perceived as threatening).

7.8  Independent experts
We have identified that independent experts exert a major influence on the 
Courts of first instance, less so the appeal courts.  The use and utility of independent experts has been discussed in section 6.3.

8. Regulations or constraints upon the Actor Group
The group itself is diverse and so therefore are the constraints. We confine our comments to the main participants whom we consider to be the courts themselves, the regulators (including the HSE), and the independent experts.

In the case of the regulator, it may exercise only such authority as is decreed by statute. Moreover, “its procedures, jurisdiction, functions, and authority are subject to revision by the legislature’s enactment of a new statute at any time, indeed, any action taken by an agency is subject to legislative correction or reversal.” However, regulators perform a major function in interpreting the law for protecting the public from hazards and in applying their perspective to individual cases. This role is widely seen as beneficial, to be respected, and in some cases feared. However, subtle shifts in the regulator’s perspective, or omissions from it, may have profound effects. The former Health and Safety Commission no doubt helped ensure that the HSE stayed true to its mission, but now that HSC has been merged into HSE this safeguard has been removed.

Unlike regulators who are provided by legislation with a comprehensive overview of their given area which enables them to take a concerted approach the courts are reliant upon parties bringing cases before them which means that their influence is necessarily piecemeal.  The doctrine of precedent requires courts at first instance to follow relevant decisions of the Appeal Courts.  

Few courts of first instance have the confidence to conduct the balancing act of risk, gravity of injury, cost and social value that Lord Hoffman undertook in Tomlinson –v- Congleton Borough Council (2003) UK HL 47.  Instead they hold tight to the detail of legislation, codes of practice and guidance losing sight of the bigger picture and the underlying principles.  The cost and complexity of an appeal means that for the majority of litigants it is only the courts of first instance that sit in judgment of them.  Whilst the Appeal Courts are constrained by the limited control that they can exercise over the subject matter of the cases that reach them the first instance courts are constrained by the need for consistency in their decision making and they are unlikely to weigh in the balance social utility unless the facts of the case which they are considering are closely aligned with an Appeal Court precedent.  

Whilst many public bodies will often find the means and the political will to pursue cases to appeal to unlock concepts of social utility many amenity groups, charities and commercial providers lack the financial resources to do so.  In addition their lawyers will provide them with cautious advice so that they limit their activities and avoid altogether expensive litigation.  

Independent experts feature only in courts of first instance.  As such they rarely take the opportunity to lift their eyes towards social utility and instead get drawn into the usual approach of the first instance courts of measuring behaviour solely against standards, codes of practice and guidance.

9. The nature and extent of unintended consequences
We consider that the consequences of the present legal system for the management of public risk are eroding the benefits of public amenities and activities. A root cause of this appears to us to lie in the application of the HSWA to the public sphere. The HSE itself has acknowledged that when this was introduced in the mid-1970s it “provoked widespread astonishment” (Section 5.2). Perhaps astonishment was warranted. 

The position of the HSE has been explained along the lines of ‘parks, and other public places are sometimes workplaces and therefore rightly come under the Act.’ While this is true, there is a subtlety which should be considered.  When these places are being used by the public for their enjoyment, they are different from workplaces, and what is then important is the trade-off between public benefit and risk of harm, not the single-minded pursuit of reduced risk as in the workplace. Indeed, in some public situations it is now agreed that some risk of harm may even be a benefit!​[37]​ 

The legislature was alive to the effect, real or perceived, of individual claims arising out of public activities or amenities and the prospect of a fear of litigation leading to risk averse behaviour. For example, the educational benefits of school trips could be lost as a result of concern that an accident could lead to litigation resulting in teachers preferring to remain within the more easily controlled environment of a classroom.  In this way the prospect of the enforcement of the rights of an individual by way of a compensation claim acts to the detriment to the rights of the group that would otherwise have benefitted from access to an activity or amenity.

The consequences of the legal process on public activities are also felt for the following additional reasons:
	The preference of the regulator for a precautionary stance.​[38]​ This automatically increases risk aversion to the neglect of benefits
	The regulatory interpretation of the notion of ‘gross disproportion’​[39]​
	The perception that standards and COPs are minimum standards without reference to underlying principals 
	The introduction of the concept of ‘societal concerns’ as a further motivation for reducing risk,27 and its occasional misapplication​[40]​
	Judicial extensions of duty of care to risks previously accepted as voluntary risk and consequent awards of compensation (section 5.3)
	Conditional fee arrangements resulting in increased insurance premiums and withdrawal of cover leading to the demise of small providers of adventurous activities as a result of the fear of expensive litigation through the mechanism of conditional fee agreements resulting in more out of court settlements (section 5.4)

10. Levers for change
In this section we identify some areas where changes could clarify the application of well established and sound legal principles under-pinning the approach to public safety in the United Kingdom, such as the concept of reasonable practicability and the principles identified by Robens. We also emphasise the need for methodologies which will enable the benefits of risk-taking activity to be properly weighed when considering the appropriateness of risk controls.

10.1 Consistency
Risk managers are often concerned by what they perceive as a lack of consistency in the judgements handed down by courts, and in carrying out this work we have noted the apparent difficulty in identifying trends in the bases of judgements handed down in public risk cases.  Whilst we would like to discern a trend towards more judgements which recognise the benefits of activities, the responsibilities of participants, and avoid the pursuit of risk minimisation as an over-riding objective, it has not been possible in the time available to us to identify relevant data beyond individual cases, some of which are mentioned herein. 

The trend to more appeals courts’ returning unanimous judgements helps deliver clarity to risk managers as does the process whereby rulings are binding on lower courts.  In preparing for cases, judges will typically ‘draw-down relevant information from other cases, although horizontal communications across the same level of courts are likely to be less influential.

Improving communications and consistency within the legal system is clearly a complex topic beyond the scope of this work but we believe it worthy of further consideration.

10.2 Risks and Benefits
In this report we have identified a number of cases where we believe important judgements have been made which achieve an appropriate balance between levels of risk, benefits, and responsibilities.  The bases on which risk-benefit decisions are reached are not clearly articulated at present and we believe that new and specific guidance on managing public risks is required which as a ‘standard’ should be influential particularly on the courts of first instance​[41]​.

10.3 Use of Standards
This report has highlighted concerns that first instance courts are, in general, far too willing to take requirements and characteristics expressed in standards as absolute requirements from which it is not acceptable to deviate.  Our standards setters report recommended that standards should contain explicit advice on how they should be used by courts taking account of their scope and limitations.

The standards setters’ report also stresses the importance of monitoring the effects and experience arising from implementing standards, regular review, and revision as appropriate.  We also considered that formal approval of standards and standards making processes by the appropriate regulator would increase the status of standards.

If these changes to standard setting processes take place, it would be expected to require the courts of first instance to ensure that the standards they were using in making judgements were current, relevant and reasonable.  It would also be likely to require that more consideration be given to underlying principles.

10.4 No-fault compensation
The insurers group have already expressed their concern that moving to an administrative no-fault compensation scheme would remove from the duty holders and participants the incentives to improve their risk management systems.  This must be considered against the apparent savings in terms of legal costs in moving away from a liability-based system.

10.5 Conservative Advice
Elsewhere in this report we have discussed the tendency for legal advice to be overly cautious and conservative in the interests of minimising the likelihood of legal action or its consequences.  Whilst this may minimise the risk of a successful claim and substantial financial or reputational damage, it can come at a price in terms of restricting the duty holder’s  operational freedom (see figure 1) and imposing additional administrative costs from such as more detailed and extensive record keeping.

Presenting legal advice in a way that gives the duty holder scope to decide the amount of ‘legal’ risk he is prepared to accept may help to remove some of what may be seen as avoidable and unnecessarily burdensome restrictions.  However it must be remembered that it may be necessary in criminal cases brought under health and safety legislation to produce evidence of risk controls adopted, reviewed and maintained and hence that the employer had done all that was reasonably practicable.

10.6 Voluntary Risks
Some of the more recently developed approaches to managing risks to the public such as those by the Visitor Safety in the Countryside Group and the National Water Safety Forum recognise the importance of the public being presented with risk in a way that enables them to make an informed decision whether they wish to accept that risk and obtain the benefits (in their view) of the activity or experience.  Whether risks are taken voluntarily or involuntarily will have implications for the duty of care of the organisation involved.  We believe this aspect would benefit from further guidance and best practice advice, perhaps in concert with the actions discussed at 10.2 and 10.3 above.

10.7 Risk Acceptability
Whether risk is taken on a voluntary or involuntary basis is a key factor in determining risk acceptability and the magnitude of that risk.  There are other well-established factors which could usefully inform the acceptability decision such as where the benefits go, whether the risk is manmade or natural, the degree of ‘dread’ of the consequences, and so on.  These too are aspects which could benefit from further discussion and guidance of their role in the legal system. 

10.8 Economic pressures for intended consequences


























A response: points made by legal professionals in an event to discuss this research  

The legal group is broad and diverse, including the courts (first instance, appeals, administrative and coroners), judges, barristers, solicitors, experts, legal regulators and tribunals.

Interactions with the first instance courts​[42]​
The media are very important in jury cases where the public will be considering evidence from a particular cultural standpoint.  They can also influence a risk averse court of first instance judge.  They may look to set their own agenda on the facts of a case, which can work both to exaggerate culpability (for example presenting the case as a government failure...) and underplay it (for example as health and safety "gone mad").  The media are seen as having a greater effect on the courts of first instance than the appeal courts.  The media’s impact can be helpful or unhelpful, for example highlighting fraudulent cases or trivialising serious cases. 

Appeal courts have a strong influence on the courts of first instance since appeal court rulings are binding on the lower courts.

Standards – produced by standard setters – have a role in findings of fact in the courts. However, the standards used are usually ones in law, rather than non-legislative standards.

Regulators such as the Bar Council and the Legal Service Board clearly have influence over court processes.

Experts are often used in court to provide one type of evidence. Courts however take a broader view of the evidence than that provided by experts alone.  First instance judges are seen as being greatly affected by witnesses of fact and expertise.

Insurers can affect which cases are brought to a court because they often fund the cases, but once a case starts they do not have an influence on it.   Insurers’ choices as to whether to fight poor cases rather than settle them can be influential – through media reporting, they could influence claimants decisions to bring a claim in future cases and lawyers decisions to pursue them.  

The public are affected by settlements out of court, which may encourage others to claim.  The judiciary take their line on risk from society, so if the public's perception changed then so would the judiciary’s.

The legal aid budget is primarily spent in high profile cases. Low end criminals may be denied justice because legal aid may not be available.  

Decisions and trends in first instance decisions feed back into the legal profession and insurers - informing decisions on whether to settle or fight cases.

The Crown Prosecution Service does not press ahead to trial unless they have a high probability of a successful verdict.  

The police might not arrest or investigate crimes if they think they are not going to be successful in trial or get weak sentences.

Victim of Crime statements impact on the courts of first instance. They have helped courts understand the cost to the victim and therefore the cost to society.

Other groups who interact with the court of first instance are: duty holders, solicitors, barristers, the legal profession more widely, the civil service, local authorities, claims management companies, and the Law Commission.


Interactions with appeal court processes 
The public influence appeal courts indirectly through influencing politicians and the media. The public are also obviously influenced by the judgements of appeals courts.  As with the courts of first instance, the judiciary take their line on risk from society, so if the public's perception changed then so would the judiciary’s.

Academics have a greater influence on appeal courts than courts of first instance because academic work focuses on principles rather than individual disposal of cases. The variable role of academics may be one of the factors in the different role of principles between first instance and appeals courts.

Politicians may change the law in light of a decision they are not happy with. Similarly, civil servants may respond to judgements they disagree with or they are not happy with.






Lawyers and those funding cases influence each other – this influence is not easy to disentangle.   The Government provide funding for cases and regulate some funding systems.  The fact that the loser pays the winner’s costs make certain funding mechanisms viable or attractive to lawyers and insurers.

Insurers are affected by their shareholders, customers, lawyers, other insurers, case law and tariffs set by judges.  They are involved in both paying out cases and insuring people against losing cases.  Insurers currently pass on the risk to their clients through increased premiums.  They could be more selective in what they defend rather than settling claims, to send a stronger message to the lawyers as to which cases to take on.

Politicians and the media can reverse the trend towards more risk aversion. Better communication with the public of the benefits to certain risks can help.  Politicians also need to be more willing to say "this was a tragic accident" and not to respond with regulation or legislation.

The public and the media need to be persuaded to change their attitudes to risk. The government can have a role in doing this - obesity is an example - some people want a ‘Nanny State’ and request government to "protect" society. However, other groups do not want increased regulation. It is not clear the size of opinion on either side, however government can influence the public perception of whether it is a personal responsibility or societal risk.

The media can affect society’s values and norms. For example, fraudulent health claims used to be considered as a victimless crime. However, advertising and the media have shifted this opinion slightly.

The courts are just a small part of the law – which is the real influence over people – i.e. the general understanding of rights and duties.

Solicitors and barristers often do not rely upon the available 'dicta' (generally applicable judicial opinions) in the area of risk.

There is no evidence of a 'rising trend of damages'.

Litigation is very focused (possibly on two or three key facts).  This means that the courts are not a good forum for debating benefits to society versus risk - you will never hear the benefit to society defence in court. 
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